UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CR-13-607

-against-

United States Courthouse

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Central Islip, New York

PHILLIP A. KENNER and TOMMY C. CONSTANTINE,

Defendants.

March 13, 2015

----X 2:30 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BIANCO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Government: LORETTA E. LYNCH

United States Attorney

100 Federal Plaza

Central Islip, New York 11722 BY: JAMES MISKIEWICZ, ESQ.

Assistant United States Attorney

For the Defendants: RICHARD HALEY, ESQ.

For Mr. Kenner

ROBERT LA RUSSO, ESQ. For Mr. Constantine

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Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography.

Transcript produced by computer.

1	2 THE CLERK: Calling criminal case number
2	13-CR-607, United States of America vs. Phillip Kenner and
3	Tommy Constantine.
4	Counsel, please state your appearance for the
5	record.
6	MR. MISKIEWICZ: Good afternoon, your Honor.
7	James Miskiewicz, for the United States.
8	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
9	MR. HALEY: Good afternoon, Judge.
10	Richard Haley, for the defendant Phillip Kenner
11	seated to my right.
12	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
13	MR. LARUSSO: Robert LaRusso, for
14	Mr. Constantine.
15	Good afternoon, your Honor.
16	With your permission, we have Mr. Constantine on
17	telephone call right now.
18	I would like to express my thanks. I know it
19	was a late request and I appreciate the opportunity to
20	have Mr. Constantine call in rather than a personal
21	appearance and I thank the Court for that.
22	THE COURT: Mr. Constantine, are you able to
23	hear everybody okay?
24	MR. CONSTANTINE: Yes, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: If, at any point, you're having

3 1 trouble, let me know. 2 THE DEFENDANT: I will. Thank you. 3 THE COURT: So, as you know, we're here for 4 argument on the defendants' motions, various pretrial 5 motions. 6 I did receive Mr. LaRusso's reply in connection 7 with his motion. 8 And as I discussed, Mr. Halev, I will give you a 9 chance to orally reply with respect to his motion. 10 You don't have to go through every aspect of 11 your motion. It's a chance for you to highlight anything 12 you wish to highlight, and then I'll give the government a 13 chance to respond. 14 Mr. LaRusso, do you want to go first. 15 MR. LARUSSO: Thank you, your Honor. 16 Your Honor, if I could just address the first 17 part of our motion and that is the motion to dismiss the 18 indictment for misconduct, governmental misconduct. 19 I would like to preface my remarks by saying 20 when I first began reviewing this case and discussing the 21 possibility of this motion, I was kind of a little 22 reluctant to put pen to paper. 23 But since the time I had that hesitation, I have 24 had an opportunity to talk to my client at length and 25 obviously more important, your Honor, I had an opportunity

4 1 to look at the indictment and the evidence that the 2 government has presented. 3 To be candid with the Court. I'm not as well 4 versed in the facts as my client because I have not had as 5 much time to review them, but there's enough information 6 that's been presented to me, reliable information, that 7 supported our request for the motion to dismiss. 8 What I think in a practical sense, Judge, I 9 don't think that motion can be addressed simply on papers. 10 I think, looking at the allegations of 11 impropriety, it raises the issue of a possible hearing, 12 and I think that's the first aspect I would like the Court 13 to examine at this point, whether or not enough 14 information is presented to the Court to warrant a hearing 15 to determine whether or not there was selective 16 presentation of evidence, selective withholding of 17 evidence in the first grand jury, that resulted in the 18 indictment. 19 I know having been before you, Judge, you read 20 all of the materials and you digest it very well and as I 21 talk and raise issues, you will pinpoint the critical 22 areas that are of concern to you and I'll be glad to 23 answer them if they become apparent. 24 In terms of an overall presentation, your Honor,

this is a very unusual case. It began in the Southern

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District of New York for a number of years. And for whatever reason we know they decided not to pursue the matter; and, instead, they referred the matter over to the Eastern District of New York.

And I can hazard a reasonable guess that it was the case agent in this case, Mr. Galioto, who was responsible for that presentation.

What was also very significant, Judge, is some of the color behind this case.

The unknown shadow that is going to play a role at this trial is a number of individuals, one of whom you know from the paperwork, is a man by the name of Kenneth Jowdy, who seems to have skirted his responsibilities in this case, represented by a very well known lawyer in New York City who was very instrumental in developing contact with the Daily News and presented publicity detrimental to my client prior to this indictment.

More importantly, Mr. Jowdy is represented by Mr. Louie Freeh, who is a former director of the FBI. I'm not saying, Judge, and I will not ask the Court to draw the conclusion that there's an impropriety in Mr. Freeh representing Mr. Jowdy or Mr. Galioto, an FBI agent pursuing the case, or any other reason, other than what he felt was a legitimate criminal investigation, but it just raises an important color in terms of how we look at the

6 1 facts. 2 THE COURT: Let me just try to focus you a 3 little bit. 4 I have read the papers and some of the history 5 of the case we already discussed in connection with bail 6 applications and other issues, so I understand it started 7 in the Southern District. 8 For purpose of what you're arguing on the 9 dismissal, there are two things you appear to be arguing, 10 that there's a basis for a dismissal or review by the 11 Court of the grand jury transcript. 12 The first relates to an allegation that the 13 agent told a witness in a civil litigation deposition --14 instructed the witness not to answer certain questions. 15 That's one, right? 16 MR. LARUSSO: That's one. 17 THE COURT: On that one --18 MR. LARUSSO: On that as well, Judge, it's kind 19 of a corollary to that. 20 There was also a civil litigation involving an 21 investment hockey player by the name of Tyson Nash. He 22 was approached by Mr. Galioto to refrain from bringing a 23 suit against two of the government witnesses, Mr. Berard 24 and Mr. Kaiser, and he obviously did not listen to that 25 kind of request by Mr. Galioto, so there's a joint portion

7 1 of Mr. Galioto's conduct that we claim tried to interfere 2 with the judicial process. 3 And the important point here, Judge, is in 4 counter to the government's argument that it's irrelevant 5 to this case, is the questions in the deposition were 6 related to the global settlement. 7 THE COURT: I know it couldn't have effected the 8 grand jury presentation, because it happened afterwards. 9 It could not have had any impact on the grand jury because 10 it happened afterwards. 11 In fact, in your reply, the lawyer, whatever 12 effort was or was not made with regard to preventing the 13 question from being answered, it looks like that through a 14 motion to compel the question was answered subsequently in 15 a telephonic deposition, a supplemental deposition. 16 I don't understand how that issue could be the 17 basis for a dismissal of an indictment that had already 18 been issued. It's pre-attenuated, even assuming that it 19 occurred, it's so attenuated. 20 The standard for dismissal of an indictment, as 21 you know, is extremely high. How could an indictment be 22 dismissed for something that happened afterwards in a 23 civil litigation? 24 MR. LARUSSO: You know, Judge, that obviously 25 was of concern to me.

And what I realized by looking at these post-indictment actions of Mr. Galioto, which I think are clearly inappropriate, is that it colors the presentation of the evidence to the grand jury. It gives you an idea or a mindset of the person who would selectively present testimony before a grand jury.

This indictment was returned I think it was about a year-and-a-half ago. I wasn't around during the early stages, Judge, but it wasn't that far back.

And these actions are consistent with an agent who would selectively present testimony in the grand jury, who would withhold information that may give the grand jury a different view of the evidence.

Judge, we're looking at the grand jury in the situation of trying to get a fair presentation. And if our allegations have a semblance of support that there were facts that altered the government's theory of the facts, not the theory of the case, then Mr. Galioto's present conduct in trying to protect these witnesses and trying to tell them to sue other people other than government witnesses in terms of not talking about the global settlement fund, all of which gives you an idea, wait a minute, maybe there was some merit to these allegations that are being made.

That's the point, Judge. That's why I say it

9 1 relates back to the intent, it relates back to the person 2 who we are alleging was involved in the impropriety. 3 THE COURT: And the second piece deals with 4 Mr. Privitello. 5 I read the back and forth on that, I read your 6 client's affidavit. But putting aside the Sergei Gonchar 7 piece, that's a separate piece, and I'll ask the 8 Government about this, but it appears they may not be 9 pursuing that piece any longer. 10 But the core of what your client appears to be 11 claiming is that there's an explanation for where the 12 funds went and why they went there. 13 But, again, their failure to put in what his 14 explanation is of that, it is my understanding of the law, 15 is not a basis for a dismissal of the indictment. 16 In fact, I was reading his affidavit very 17 carefully and there appears to be an acknowledgement that 18 a portion of Mr. Privitello's funds, regardless of what 19 Mr. Gonchar told him he could or could not do with the 20 funds he was investing, that a portion of Mr. Privitello's 21 funds were used to pay for Mr. Constantine's personal 22 expenses, including the legal fees out of the other 23 lawsuit related to a race car team. I'm not even sure 24 what it relates to. 25 In his affidavit, his response to that was most

10 1 of it was Mr. Gonchar's money, which I interpreted to be 2 an acknowledgment that a portion of it was 3 Mr. Privitello's money and apparently some of his money 4 also went to Mr. Gonchar -- Mr. Privitello's money went to 5 Mr. Gonchar. So, again, I'm not sure I understand, and I saw 6 7 he has an explanation for why there's a theory that paying 8 the legal fees of a civil case was appropriate in some 9 way. I saw something along those lines. 10 Again, as you know, it's a criminal case. The 11 defendants may have explanations for what they're doing, 12 but the Government's failure to stand up in the grand 13 jury, even assuming they knew that was his explanation, 14 and tell the grand jury, well, Mr. Constantine, if he were 15 sitting here, would say this is why he did this, that's 16 not a basis for a dismissal of an indictment. 17 MR. LARUSSO: Judge --18 THE COURT: Am I reading the facts wrong? 19 My understanding of the facts is some of it is 20 his money. We can go back and forth about how much, but a 21 portion of Mr. Privitello's money was used apparently by 22 Mr. Constantine to pay for legal fees and to pay 23 Mr. Gonchar for something, or am I wrong about that? I thought that's what his affidavit acknowledged. 24 25 MR. LARUSSO: I spoke to my client. When you

11 1 have a factual dispute, that's for a trial, not for the 2 Court to make a determination. 3 My client showed me documentation and gave me 4 the history of these allegations. 5 Mr. Galioto was well aware of what happened with 6 that \$155,000; yet, the indictment alleges that it went to 7 AC Falcon based upon that allegation that \$155,000 that 8 was allegedly diverted was used to forfeit an airplane. 9 Well, Mr. Galioto was well aware, Judge, that 10 that money did not go to AC Falcon. It went to a 11 different company called AC Avalon. 12 As soon as that money went to that company, 13 there was a correction made and it went to the proper 14 company, Eufora, and payment for bills. 15 So, right away, the first thing that comes to 16 mind is wait a minute. You have 155,000. The agent knew 17 or should have known, if he had looked at the proper 18 documentation, the bank records, he would have been able 19 to see that the money was diverted the next day 20 immediately back to the account where it should have been. 21 What the government does is they then take the 22 superseding indictment and they mask this. They take out 23 the specific allegations in the indictment which we 24 demonstrated in our motion to dismiss was wrong, and they

now go from a specific allegation, which we refuted, to

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now a general allegation, which I don't even know yet what
the personal expenses they claim were paid for by some of
the money that they claim was diverted.

So this is just one aspect of what we're looking at. We're not looking at just each one individually and saying to the Court that there is no factual dispute.

There may be some factual disputes. There's more to this.

The other thing that was very, very interesting, Judge, is when we filed our motion and raised the issue of evidence withholding to protect witnesses such as Mr. Kaiser, evidence withholding to protect witnesses such as Mr. Jowdy, and, Judge, you can almost tell from the tone of my voice, the progression of my own unbelief of what was taking place when you finally look at some of the facts.

So the superseding indictment comes down. We removed the specific allegations. We now have general allegations that we're not sure exactly where the specific funds were diverted to. We will have to guess at that. And maybe we should be asking the government for a bill of particulars to give us a little more information on what we're going to be defending.

There was another aspect, Judge, in addition to the Privitello matter, in addition to the Kaiser situation, in addition to the Ken Jowdy situation which

13 1 I'll discuss in a minute. This came to me recently, very 2 recently. 3 Mr. Constantine and Mr. Kenner are accused of 4 diverting approximately \$4.1 million from the global 5 settlement fund. The Court knows what that is, why it was 6 brought into effect. 7 I had a chance to speak to Mr. Gonchar recently 8 and I learned from Mr. Gonchar that he hired a forensic 9 accountant by the name of Mr. Stempel, and Mr. Stempel 10 went through the expenditures from that account. 11 Mr. Gonchar is satisfied that the money was 12 spent -- and he's one of the hockey players and probably 13 one of the individuals who invested most -- that the money 14 was spent, as he understood it, and I know the government 15 is going to say there are other hockey players and they 16 have a different view of it, but the point I'm making, 17 Judge, is that even here there is a substantial question 18 regarding whether or not the grand jury had an opportunity 19 to review this critical evidence of a hockey player who in 20 indictment number one is a victim, and is no longer in the 21 indictment that's been returned by the Government. 22 Why? This forensic accountant, did he testify 23 in the grand jury? Did he give his report as to why the 24 \$4.1 million in his mind was properly spent? 25 Clearly, he didn't because the grand jury

14 1 returned an indictment charging Mr. Kenner and 2 Mr. Constantine. Another example. 3 The other one, Judge, is as much as a serving 4 instrument as the one I related. In the old indictment, I 5 think it's paragraphs 31 and 32, the government talks 6 specifically about \$700,000 being invested by hockey 7 players, and that the money was then diverted to 8 Mr. Kenner and to Mr. Constantine. 9 Well, I looked at the records. Mr. Constantine 10 didn't get a penny of that. The money went a portion to 11 Mr. Kaiser and as the indictment says, the first 12 indictment, he returned it to Mr. Kenner. 13 What the evidence doesn't show is that if you 14 got all the bank records, which we did not, especially 15 Mr. Kaiser who is a witness for the government, he got 16 more money than the \$70,300 that the government claimed he 17 got in return, he got approximately \$105,000 more. 18 So the point I'm making, Judge, when we start to 19 look at these isolated incidents, they mount up and the 20 superseding indictment is just further proof that 21 something was wrong in that grand jury, something 22 drastically wrong, because all my client wanted was a fair 23 presentation of the evidence before the grand jury. It didn't happen and I'm not asking for a 24

dismissal because that's inappropriate now. I'll be

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15 1 asking for that if the Court gives us at least an 2 opportunity to have a hearing. 3 The last one that was very interesting to me, 4 and I'm just learning this, Judge, everybody says that 5 Mr. Jowdy is a victim. Well, from what I'm learning, 6 Mr. Jowdy is more than a victim, he was a participant. 7 In the first indictment, paragraph 31, they talk 8 about \$250,000 being invested by a John Doe number eight 9 in Eufora -- I'm sorry, in a Mexican land venture. 10 Instead, the allegation is that the money was 11 diverted to Eufora. 12 Well, there's no mention of Jowdy in that 13 \$250,000, but the records are going to show that Mr. Jowdy 14 actually got \$8 million for the land development from the 15 250 that's alleged in the indictment went hockey players. 16 to his company. I don't know if it was the Baha 17 Corporation or the Diamante Corporation. 18 But you know what Mr. Jowdy does? He takes the 19 \$250,000, he then sends it to Eufora as his investment 20 under LMJ Management. 21 Where is this in the indictment? 22 The government withholds these records from 23 Mr. Jowdy, Baha, the LMJ, which would have shown Mr. Jowdy 24 was more than a victim, he was a participant in the 25 fraudulent scheme.

16 1 So when I looked at all these incidents, I said 2 to myself, well, wait a minute. We have specific 3 allegations. My client has alleged improprieties in 4 regards to at least three or four in the indictment. He's 5 now coming in and he's faced with an indictment that no 6 longer has the specificity, they removed the questionable 7 factual material, and that's where Mr. Galioto's efforts 8 to interfere with the judicial process and to get somebody 9 to sue Mr. Kenner as opposed to Mr. Kaiser or Mr. Berard, 10 two of the government's witnesses, adds color to what 11 really transpired. 12 So I'm asking the Court, in terms of looking at 13 our questions regarding a fair review of the facts, that 14 there should at least be a hearing on the matters that I 15 have addressed here briefly. I marked them as four 16 separate areas. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to address the 18 severance issue briefly. 19 MR. LARUSSO: Yes, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: My only question on that is they're 21 not going to introduce the Home Depot recording, so I want 22 you to confirm, I don't see any piece of evidence talking 23 about an e-mail to potentially raising some issue. 24 I'm not aware of any piece of evidence,

admissible evidence, that creates some confrontation

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17 1 clause issue where Mr. Kenner is saying something about 2 your client in some piece of evidence that he won't be 3 able to challenge. It's not an evidentiary issue at this 4 point. 5 MR. LARUSSO: I think right now it's the 6 government's position that they're not going to use the 7 tape, that my argument that the introduction of that tape 8 would prejudice my client barring a severance has 9 obviously been removed. 10 But there always is and will be the possibility 11 that Mr. Kenner will testify in his own behalf, and that 12 he will then present his version of the facts and the 13 government would be able to introduce the tape and the 14 substance of the tape through him. 15 So I'm very -- I guess I look forward in 16 advancement as to what will happen at trial. I see that 17 as a distinct possibility. 18 Your Honor, the tape is not the only reason 19 we're moving for severance. 20 We're also moving for severance on the grounds 21 that there are substantially antagonistic defenses between 22 Mr. Kenner and Mr. Constantine. They're going to be 23 pointing the finger at each other. 24 THE COURT: The cases are clear that finger 25 pointing is not sufficient for a severance.

The standard is for it to be so antagonistic to warrant a separate trial, the jurors would have to, in order to believe one person's defense, would have to conclude that the other person was guilty.

And I don't see that as a situation here. Even if both defendants testified and said to the jury, well, I didn't do anything wrong. I gave the money to Mr. Constantine, and Mr. Constantine says I didn't do anything wrong, I gave the money to Mr. Kenner.

That doesn't necessarily -- the jury could have found neither of them committed fraud, yet they relied on each other, but neither of them committed any fraud.

Your argument to me in the first motion is that there was no fraud at all, so why couldn't the jury conclude that even though to some extent they may be saying I wasn't responsible, he was responsible, the jury could conclude that neither of them did anything wrong.

MR. LARUSSO: There are substantial indications, Judge, they're going to be pointing the finger at each other and the jurors will have to decide if this person says this, then the other has to be guilty.

For example, as I mentioned in the brief, the government themselves in the search warrant that was executed in Mr. Kenner's house, they referred to an e-mail that Mr. Kenner had sent where he accuses Mr. Constantine

19 1 of misappropriating money from the global settlement fund. 2 Now I know from the facts of the case, Judge, 3 that Mr. Kenner reviewed all of the expenditures that were 4 attributed to the global settlement fund, and many of the 5 allegations stem from his belief that those expenditures 6 were inappropriate and Mr. Constantine was responsible for 7 the theft. So just looking at the \$4.1 million allegations 8 9 in the indictment, you've got two fingers pointing in the 10 direct opposite way. 11 I have Mr. Gonchar, and a forensic accountant, 12 and Mr. Constantine saying one thing, and I got Mr. Kenner 13 who will be taking the stand and at least on 14 cross-examination pointing the finger at Mr. Constantine. 15 That was actually the basis for that count, that 16 report that was done and reviewed by Mr. Kenner in regards 17 to the expenditures, but there's more than that. 18 THE COURT: If Mr. Kenner says I didn't 19 misappropriate that money, any money that was taken out of 20 there was taken by Mr. Constantine. 21 And if Mr. Constantine has a legitimate 22 explanation for what happened to the money, it doesn't 23 matter that Mr. Kenner is saying I didn't take that money, 24 he took that money. The question is whether or not 25

there's a legitimate reason.

20 1 MR. LARUSSO: And that's the important thing. 2 What if the jury believes him and doesn't believe my 3 client? I know they're going to say A and B, but it's 4 what the jury is going to do. If the jury says I don't 5 believe you, I believe him, we're in the area where 6 antagonistic defenses are at least looked at by the Court 7 as a possibility for severance. 8 That's what I'm saying, Judge, is that if you 9 look at the facts, your client is going to say he didn't 10 do it, but if they don't believe him, then that means he's 11 going to be found guilty. 12 THE COURT: I don't follow that. 13 If Mr. Kenner says I didn't take any money, that 14 money went to Mr. Constantine, right? 15 That doesn't necessarily mean Mr. Constantine 16 did anything wrong either. Mr. Constantine can say, yeah, 17 I had that money, but the victim gave me permission to use 18 it in this manner. It doesn't -- he's not necessarily 19 pointing the finger back at Mr. Kenner. 20 MR. LARUSSO: It's even simpler than that, 21 Judge. 22 When Mr. Constantine -- when Mr. Kenner says 23 that Mr. Constantine took the money, he took it for 24 purposes other than what it should have been for, period, 25 end of story. That's why he claims in this indictment that

21 1 Mr. Constantine defrauded the investors by taking this 2 money. 3 It's very simple in terms of when you look at 4 the expenses, Mr. Kenner is going to say that they were 5 not related to the global settlement fund and 6 Mr. Constantine is going to say that they are. 7 The question is do you believe one or the other, 8 and you'll necessarily have a problem with the jury. 9 That's the point that I was making. 10 There are other aspects of this, Judge, to 11 provide support for the Court to realize Mr. Kenner's 12 position is antagonistic. 13 There was the counterclaim that my client filed 14 in one of the lawsuits where he was detailing the fraud 15 that Mr. Kenner and others were involved in. That was an 16 exhibit to our original motion. 17 Then there was actually a recording that we 18 recently received. I apologize. We may not have recently 19 received it. I haven't had a chance to really listen to 20 I'm told it's a recording where Mr. Kenner accuses 21 Mr. Constantine in a curse word that he had in effect 22 taken the money from the global settlement. 23 So from the specific allegations that have been 24 made in prior proceedings, Judge, we know what the 25 parties' position are going to be.

22 1 And one of the things that I learned and, again, 2 I apologize. I tried finding this in the status reports 3 before the Court, but I understand Mr. Kenner's lawyer at 4 one time actually said he may be acting as a prosecutor in 5 his examination of the witnesses at the trial, which leads 6 credence to the fact that they see the positions of the 7 codefendants as being antagonistic and warrant 8 consideration. 9 THE COURT: I think that covers your motions, 10 right? 11 MR. LARUSSO: It does, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: I'll let the government respond to 13 that, Mr. Haley, before you go. 14 Go ahead, Mr. Miskiewicz. 15 MR. MISKIEWICZ: Thank you, your Honor. 16 With respect to the motion for dismissal, if the 17 Court has any questions, I'll be happy to answer them. 18 Otherwise, we rest on our submission. 19 THE COURT: Mr. LaRusso's argument is that the 20 indictment has essentially shifted; Mr. Gonchar is out, 21 and that there are aspects to certain allegations with 22 respect to the airplane that the government is now 23 disavowing. I do want you to respond to that. 24 MR. MISKIEWICZ: The government isn't disavowing 25 the overall fraud, and ultimately the nature of the Eufora

fraud is such that the defendants, both Kenner and Constantine, but in this case we will focus on Mr. Constantine, induced a number of individuals to invest in a company based on certain representations about its credit worthiness implicitly, and also its ability to make money in the near term.

And specifically, for instance, as to Mr. Privitello, on the nature of what he was getting for the money he invested, that he would become an operating member -- this was an LLC, not a corporation so that he would get shares, but they got pro rata memberships in this LLC.

And with respect to the wire transfers that we have really deleted I guess is the right word in the superseding indictment, is that that doesn't mean that we disavowed the nature of the fraud.

We simply recognized that the strongest, if you will, evidence is not this one tiny little piece of where this money went.

It may very well have been an inadvertent diversion at that stage, and ultimately temporarily went back into Eufora for the sake of Eufora, but what the overall evidence is going to show is that much of the money was sent or used really for the defendant's own personal benefit.

And with respect to Mr. Privitello, because that was the wire transfer at issue, the evidence, the documentary evidence, is going to show that Mr. Constantine represented to Mr. Privitello that he would obtain a 1.5 share of Eufora in exchange for his investment, and other people would get other percentages.

And, yet, what he did and what he did even in sworn affidavits in the Eastern District of New York in civil litigation that preceded the indictment, he disavowed ever making such an agreement and to this day Mr. Privitello is out the money, he is out a percentage interest in Eufora. He has basically had his pocket picked by Mr. Constantine.

So that misdirection probably was not the best evidence of Mr. Constantine's fraudulent intent; and so consequently, to streamline the case, the government did redact it or removed it from the superseding indictment, but we do not disavow and we have not changed our theory.

He took people's money, he used it for his own benefit, and then he denied people what he had promised that they would get in exchange for their investments.

MR. LARUSSO: Your Honor, can I make one point?
I think it's partly in response, but I want to emphasize this.

In the superseding indictment, the government

removed approximately eight victims. It went from 19 hockey players to 11, one of whom is Mr. Gonchar who I mentioned in my argument I've spoken with him and flatly refutes the government's allegations in this indictment.

But there are others, others who are not aligned with the Government witnesses. There's evidence in the grand jury that they were victims. I don't know what evidence was presented by Mr. Galioto regarding those hockey players, and why they were victims of this massive fraud, but they now have been removed, as have many of the general allegations.

And the motion we're making is that we didn't get a fair presentation. There was not in any respect an opportunity for the jurors to assess the relevant evidence on now only 11 victims as opposed to 19.

Why they're no longer victims is a substantial question, and why the specific allegations are removed is also a substantial question in light of some of the issues we raised with the Court.

I can't ask every single question regarding how that money was spent and what the analysis showed. I hope to be prepared to do that at trial.

I'm just raising the question that there is something amiss here. There was certainly not just mistakes, but deliberate efforts to ignore evidence and

26 1 now the government's own superseding indictment adds fuel 2 to the fire. They're conceding that these people weren't 3 the victims as they were allegedly portrayed in that grand 4 jury. 5 I appreciate the opportunity to make that 6 comment, your Honor. 7 MR. MISKIEWICZ: May I respond? 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. MISKIEWICZ: There will no doubt be 10 testimony from Mr. Gonchar and other victims at trial 11 where they will say to this day they don't have a clue 12 what Mr. Constantine and Mr. Kenner have done with their 13 money. 14 Moreover, they will say that they've heard for 15 years allegations about fraud by a great number of people, 16 John Kaiser and Mr. Jowdy being among them. 17 What each of those victims will say, and 18 Mr. Gonchar is one of them since I've spoken to him, and I 19 anticipate that all of them will say that all those 20 allegations about fraudulent conduct by others comes from 21 and ends with the two defendants in this case. 22 And the litigation that has preceded here 23 basically I think it's really irrelevant, but if one were 24 to pour over the litigation, one would see that numerous 25 victims who claimed fraud on the part of the defendants

here in the civil context, the defendants responded in

2 exactly the same way that Mr. LaRusso is responding here

3 now, which is it's not us, it's other people.

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So it may very well be that some of the witnesses -- and frankly we're being careful in our preparation because some of those witnesses are going to see on the stand for the first time how the money went into the pockets of the defendants, Kenner and Constantine, and the fact that they have said in previous context I think these guys were great, which is essentially what Mr. Gonchar has said, is really going to be perhaps one of the things I'll even affirmatively try to get out from them, and then show them where the money went and then we will see if Mr. Gonchar and other victims continue to maintain that position, or if suddenly the jury sees the light bulb go off in their heads and realizes that the people that they thought were so great for all these years are actually people who have stolen all their money.

That's really ultimately -- it's an unusual sort of twist to a complex white collar fraud, but I'm certain that that is going to be something that I think will be revealed throughout the trial.

It does not, however, require either an evidentiary hearing or dismissal on the grounds of

28 1 government misconduct. There has been no government 2 misconduct. 3 MR. LARUSSO: Your Honor, just one last point. 4 I think what Mr. Miskiewicz is failing to 5 realize, Mr. Gonchar was listed as a victim. He, himself, 6 doesn't believe he was, and there was no opportunity to 7 pursue that or present a fair documentation regarding 8 whether he was or wasn't right. 9 But be that as it may, the two points I wanted 10 to make is, and I don't know if Mr. Miskiewicz is aware of 11 this, but Mr. Jowdy has been sued for trying by a number 12 of hockey players. 13 There was \$25 million invested in the Mexican 14 development that have been lost. Nobody seems to be 15 focusing on that. But there is a suit pending to try and 16 get the records for Mr. Jowdy. 17 I only say this because I know it's going to 18 dovetail into Mr. Haley's argument. 19 Mr. Jowdy is an individual who the government 20 attempted to protect by keeping him out of the indictment 21 in light of withholding the records I mentioned to you 22 before. 23 And in order to get a fair presentation, that 24 should have been done and it was never done. 25 I would ask the Court to consider not just the

29 1 Privitello situation, but all of the documents that the 2 government withheld. 3 THE COURT: Do you want to address the 4 severance, Mr. Miskiewicz? 5 MR. MISKIEWICZ: Yes, briefly, your Honor. 6 I think your Honor already addressed the issue 7 of antagonistic defenses, as well as the government's 8 indication that we were not intending to use, nor will we 9 use, the Home Depot tape recording because of the 10 possibility of a Bruton issue arising. 11 And if I didn't say so in our submission, that 12 would go for any e-mail authored by one defendant blaming 13 the other, unless there would be some basis by which we 14 could argue that it really did constitute a coconspirator 15 statement. 16 At this stage I can't say that I found such an 17 e-mail, and otherwise we would have presented that to your 18 Honor pretrial and make a determination of that 19 admissibility under 801(d)(2)(E). 20 I would only say this generally about the 21 argument in favor of severance raised by Mr. LaRusso, and 22 it is this. 23 Virtually all of the argument is premised on 24 Mr. LaRusso and/or Mr. Haley's ability to elicit 25 inadmissible hearsay in defense of their clients.

And what I mean by that is I suspect there will be many, many questions of witnesses in this trial, government witnesses in this trial, in which they attempt to introduce into the record prior affidavits, other sorts of e-mails, self-exculpatory type of e-mails from one defendant or another, all of which will constitute an effort to shift blame to another person and self-exculpate whatever defendant happens to be running the cross-examination at that moment.

And I say that because I suspect it's going to be a reoccurring issue and may result in a lot of sidebars and I have been trying to think of a way to catalogue all of the potential documents that I suspect counsel are going to try and offer at trial. It's just so voluminous at this stage, I'm not sure I can do that.

The fact that they will not be able to -- the fact that they wish to introduce exculpating, blame shifting hearsay is also not a reason for severance.

And I'm confident that the Court will, in due course of time over the trial, make the evidentiary rulings that need to be made at that moment as to whether these documents are admissible or not.

So that doesn't answer the question about whether or not the defendants take the stand and blame each other; but, again, Mr. LaRusso's comment what if his

31 1 client takes the stand and the jury doesn't believe him, 2 his client doesn't have to take the stand, as he knows, 3 but if he does and the jury doesn't believe him, that's 4 not a basis for severance or any sort of violation. 5 fact, that's exactly what this forum is for. 6 So, other than that, if you have any questions 7 about our position regarding severance, we otherwise rest 8 on our papers. 9 THE COURT: No, I don't have any other 10 questions. 11 I'm going to place the Court's ruling on the 12 record with respect to these. I may issue a written 13 decision as well, but given obviously how close the trial 14 date is, I want to place an oral ruling on the record so 15 the parties can properly prepare. 16 First, with respect to the motion for severance, 17 the motion is denied for the following reasons: 18 First, as I think everyone concedes at this 19 point, the Court is aware and defense counsel has not 20 pointed the Court to any Bruton issue. 21 The Home Depot tape, as it stands now, is not 22 coming into evidence. I'm not aware of any other evidence 23 that would create a Bruton problem, a confrontation clause

problem, such that severance would be warranted on that

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basis.

The primary argument, the main argument, is basically one of antagonistic defenses. The law on that is clear in numerous cases, and I just going to cite two; United States vs. Escobar, 462 Fed.Appx. 58, Second Circuit 2012, where the Circuit denotes a summary order outlining the law as relates to antagonistic defenses in a detailed way.

And the bottom line, as I have discussed, is that merely finger pointing is not sufficient for there to be a severance.

The second case I'll cite is United States vs.

Corsey, 512 Fed.Appx. 6, Second Circuit 2013.

The Court in that case explained it this way; differing levels of culpability and proof are inevitable in any multi-defendant trial, and standing alone are insufficient grounds for separate trials.

And it says: Our own review of the record convinces us that this is not a case where the jury, in order to believe one defendant's testimony, would have to disbelieve the testimony of a codefendant. And they said some antagonism does not require severance.

I conclude, based upon my understanding of this case, that this is one of those situations where people may attempt to shift blame or point fingers at each other. The defendants, through their testimony or through their

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33 lawyers, may seek to do that, but I heard no defense that is going to be proffered by either Mr. Kenner or Mr. Constantine that would be a situation where the jury, in order to believe one defendant's testimony, would have to disbelieve the testimony of the codefendant. As I noted to Mr. LaRusso, the fact that they may have given responsibility to each other for particular aspects of money, or may have been under some understanding how certain money should be used, does not necessarily mean that the jury will have to disbelieve or convict the codefendant. The codefendant could have, through his own testimony or through his lawyer's presentation of evidence, perfectly good explanations for his position, what he did with the money, what representations he made to the victims that address any potential finger pointing by the codefendant. So I don't see this as one of those situations where severance is required from an evidentiary basis or from a basis of the defenses that I have heard from Mr. LaRusso, so that motion is denied.

The motion to dismiss the indictment for grand jury misconduct and I guess related misconduct as relates to the deposition is denied.

I also don't believe there's a sufficient basis

34 1 for the Court to conduct an in camera inspection of the 2 grand jury minutes and the reasons for that is as follows: 3 The standard for dismissal of an indictment, as 4 both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit has 5 emphasized in fact in a summary order in United States vs. 6 Howard, 216 F.3d 1074, Second Circuit 2000, Second Circuit 7 said: 8 Quote, the District Court cannot dismiss an 9 indictment because the prosecution presented unreliable, 10 misleading or incomplete evidence to the grand jury. 11 This is consistent with a Supreme Court case, 12 United States vs. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 1992, where the 13 Supreme Court held if the indictment is otherwise valid, 14 the government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence 15 to the grand jury is not a basis for dismissal of the 16 indictment. 17 There's another Supreme Court case, Costello vs. 18 United States, 350 U.S. 359, 1956, and finally, United 19 States vs. Jones, 164 F.3d 620, Second Circuit 1998, which 20 says: 21 Misleading testimony, including an inaccurate 22 summary of the evidence, absent other evidence for 23 prosecutorial misconduct alone, would not support 24 dismissal of the indictment. 25 I've just cited these cases as examples of how

high the standard is to dismiss an indictment based upon an argument that the Government's presentation to the grand jury was misleading or incomplete in some way because of evidence that was left out.

Based upon the arguments that have been made by defendant Constantine, I do not believe we're even in the same realm, but anything that would question the validity of the indictment and the grand jury's decision in this case, the issues regarding the civil depositions are so attenuated they certainly would not rise to any level sufficient to question the grand jury's decision in the case, or the agent's involvement in the presentation of the grand jury; and, similarly, the government's decisions with respect to not moving forward with respect to certain victims or eliminating certain aspects of their case is not a sufficient basis to dismiss an indictment.

And, in fact, as I noted, I carefully reviewed Mr. Constantine's position with respect to some of these issues; and although he has explanation that he seeks to proffer for some aspects of the diverting of Mr. Privitello's money, the government's failure to present that version -- or I don't know what exactly they should have done with respect to that -- or his claim is what they should have done with respect to that, is not a basis to dismiss the indictment.

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36 And the bottom line is the government's core fraud allegations with respect to the case, there's no indication that there was any misconduct with respect to those that would warrant dismissal of the indictment. And I also conclude there's not a sufficient basis for the Court to conduct an in camera review of the transcript of the grand jury's proceeding for all the same I believe there's been an insufficient showing to warrant that in this case, and for those reasons the motion is denied. Mr. Haley, I'll give you a chance to highlight anything you want to highlight. MR. HALEY: Yes, sir. Thank you. Your Honor, I imagine I should --THE COURT: I'm sorry, one more thing. To the extent Mr. LaRusso requested an evidentiary hearing on that, for the same reasons I don't believe an evidentiary hearing is appropriate because the proffers as to what's being challenged would be insufficient to meet the standard in any event in a hearing. For example, if there was a hearing where the

For example, if there was a hearing where the agent made some statement to a witness that could be construed as not answering a question at a deposition, even if that were established at a hearing in the

37 1 circumstances of this case, it would not warrant dismissal 2 of the indictment, or any relief with respect to the 3 indictment, so there's no purpose for an evidentiary 4 hearing on that or the other matters which are 5 insufficient to challenge the government's core allegation 6 as relates to this indictment. Otherwise, you will have a 7 mini trial, a trial before the trial about the indictment, 8 and the aspects of the indictment that the defendant is 9 challenging, and that's not how the system works. 10 Go ahead, Mr. Haley. 11 MR. HALEY: Thank you, Judge. 12 Your Honor, I guess I should begin with a little 13 bit of a confession. 14 In law school I did not do well in trusts and 15 I did not really understand the rule against estates. 16 perpetuities. 17 I did fairly well in the rules of evidence, 18 Judge, and I know what self-serving inadmissible hearsay 19 is as a concept. 20 So when Mr. Miskiewicz says to the Court that he 21 proffers that the defense of Mr. Kenner will be based upon 22 an effort on my part to elicit self-serving inadmissible 23 hearsay, that will not take place. 24 What will take place, Judge, is questioning of 25 witnesses who have testified under oath previously,

38 1 specifically the testimony of Mr. Peca, who testified 2 before the grand jury impaneled in the Southern District 3 of New York, whose testimony is contradictory to material 4 allegations even in this superseding indictment concerning 5 his knowledge of the use of his line of credit. 6 It will be based upon the testimony of Darryl 7 Sydor before the grand jury impaneled in the Southern 8 District of New York, where he similarly testified full 9 awareness of the use of his funds as deposited in his line 10 of credit. 11 It will be based upon the grand jury testimony 12 of Mr. Stevenson who testified before the grand jury 13 impaneled in the Southern District of New York, who 14 testified as well that he was fully aware of the use of 15 his line of credit, and authorized Mr. Kenner to access 16 his line of credit to make investments in the Hawaii land 17 development which the government characterizes as a 18 scheme. 19 It will be based upon the testimony of John 20 Kaiser who testified in what is known as the Nolan 21 arbitration. 22 It will be based upon the testimony of Mr. Berard who similarly testified in the Nolan 23 24 arbitration.

It will be based upon the testimony of Ken Jowdy

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39 1 who similarly testified in the Nolan arbitration and also 2 testified in other proceedings on other occasions. 3 I respectfully submit to the Court that the 4 testimony given before a grand jury and testimony given 5 before an arbitration is not hearsay, Judge, and --6 THE COURT: I don't want to spend too much time 7 on what's hearsay and what's not hearsay. I have other 8 matters on today. 9 The two aspects of your motion are the 10 computer --11 MR. HALEY: Yes, sir. 12 THE COURT: -- the computer and the subpoenas, 13 so let's stay focused on that. 14 MR. HALEY: Judge, as far as the Ganias decision 15 is concerned, I fully briefed the issue. There's an 16 affidavit submitted in support of our motion. I note the 17 government's response to that aspect of the motion is not 18 supported by affidavit. 19 So it appears, at least based on this record, 20 the government acknowledges that they're in possession of 21 personal information, significant amount of personal 22 information, contained on Mr. Kenner's MacBook computer. 23 It also appears, having been in possession of that 24 information for 16 months, it has not been purged. 25 And my argument as set forth in my brief before

the Court regarding Ganias, Ganias was focused on the need to avoid what has been historically called the general warrant, where the government will go in and simply seize everything in sight and retain it for purposes of conducting their investigation when aspects of what they seized are clearly immaterial and irrelevant to the prosecution. But I made that argument, Judge, in my papers and I will not repeat it for purposes of the record. I believe the issue is fully briefed.

Your Honor, I do appreciate the consideration your Honor gave us today because it was my request that the matter be put down for a hearing today. We have a trial date and there is a request for the issuance of Rule 17 subpoenas that we maintain, Judge, are material and necessary to the defense of the action.

I know your Honor has reviewed the relevant portions of Mr. Kenner's affidavit in that respect. It reads: Of course, in consultation with my attorney, I compiled a list of documents to be produced pursuant to the subpoena which are relevant and material to my defense.

Each document, as requested in the subpoena, concerns transactions between myself and respective John Does and Jane Doe with respect to the various allegations in the indictment.

41 1 If you look at what's set forth, Judge, on 2 Schedule A of each one of those requests, it specifically 3 refers to transactions that cover the four-corners of that 4 indictment. It specifically refers to John Does 5 identified in that indictment. 6 Judge, I'm not asking for a document from 7 Mr. Kaiser who, perhaps in application for a driver's 8 license, made a material misrepresentation such that that 9 would be used for impeachment purposes. 10 Those documents requested in the subpoenas are 11 tailored to the specific allegations in the complaint, 12 Judge. 13 THE COURT: Do you consider 13 years of bank 14 records to be tailored? 13 years of a person's bank 15 records, that's tailoring? 16 MR. HALEY: Your Honor, the answer is yes, if I 17 may respond. 18 The indictment covers a 13-year period. 19 bank records that we're looking for, if you look at those 20 subpoena requests in particular, let's start with the 21 Charles Schwab accounts. 22 What transpired here, Judge, as reflected in the 23 discovery presented by the government to date, is various 24 clients that were in contact with my client had funds 25 deposited in Charles Schwab.

There was a proposal by which they would transfer those funds from Charles Schwab to Northern Trust, and those funds would then be placed and utilized to establish a line of credit.

The documents we're requesting in the Charles

Schwab subpoena in particular is limited to those specific

John Does.

There are other John Does, Judge. We haven't requested those documents because we acquired them already in Rule 16 discovery.

Each one of these John Does with reference to the transaction in Charles Schwab, as well as the request by way of Northern Trust, signed documents on multiple occasions authorizing these funds to go from Charles Schwab and then into the Northern Trust line of credit.

And each one of those documents, Judge, the transaction reports going down through to line 23, will bear the signature of that John Doe and that will demonstrate to the jury that each one of these John Does, on multiple occasions, had to authorize the transfer and use of their funds by Phil Kenner, and that stands in direct contradiction to material aspects of this indictment.

Judge, I might add, to give your Honor some flavor, the arbitration I referred to a moment ago with

reference to the Nolan arbitration, in that arbitration, Mr. Nolan, who will be called as a witness, signed a one page document which reads as follows:

To Northern Trust: Please allow Phillip A.

Kenner to access this outstanding LLC for direct deposit into the Little Isle account at Northern Trust Bank. He's authorized to sign for the release of funds related to my line of credit.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter, signed Owen Nolan.

If those subpoenas are issued, Judge, for each one of the John Does, we expect that you are going to see, and what will be revealed in that subpoena, in those subpoenaed records, is the same letter, either identical or similar, from each one of those John Does.

And that goes to a direct allegation as set forth in the indictment which claims that the investor clients were unaware that Mr. Kenner was going to access their line of credits and had no authority to do so.

THE COURT: On the Northern Trust bank record your client admits, in his affidavit, that he hasn't had a chance to fully look at the Northern Trust records that are in the discovery. You apparently have some of them. You may have the rest of them as well.

MR. HALEY: Your Honor, I covered that this

morning with my client.

We haven't been able to access records as set forth in that affidavit. We indicated in the affidavit that we would be looking at the records we have. The records we have are incomplete.

Judge, might I say this.

THE COURT: Have you looked at every single Nolan Trust bank record yet?

MR. HALEY: The answer to that is yes, Judge.

Judge, if I may, what we're talking about here is a subpoena to a third-party institution, a banking institution.

And in order for me to be able to argue in front of the jury that there was full knowledge and disclosure as relates to these line of credits, I want the opportunity to stand up in front of that jury and say a subpoenaed was issued by the Court and pursuant to that subpoena these records are delivered.

I don't want the jury to, or the government for that matter, to make an argument that somehow that subpoena did not cover the time period in question, somehow those records did not cover the time period in question.

I want to be able to say to the jury, this is a full and complete representation of the records maintained

45 1 by that banking institution, and nowhere in those records 2 will you find a letter from Phil Kenner saying; Dear Sir: 3 Please direct that all future communications regarding 4 this individual's line of credit not be sent to his home 5 address; but, instead, be sent to me at my address in 6 Arizona. 7 Judge, we take a risk, because if those records 8 come in and there's such a document, which we maintain 9 does not exist, it will be utilized by the government. 10 Judge, one final comment. We have -- if this 11 were a civil case -- Rule 45, I would respectfully submit 12 without question, would allow those subpoenas to issue. 13 If this were a civil case, and your Honor had a 14 document of this nature signed by Owen Nolan where he 15 acknowledges receipt of -- acknowledges authorization for 16 my client to utilize those funds for those purposes, and 17 there was a motion for summary judgment, your Honor would 18 grant the motion and Mr. Nolan's statement as he related 19 in the arbitration proceeding; well, there's a lot of 20 documents I signed that I don't read, would not, with all 21 due respect, be accepted by this Court to defeat that 22 motion for summary judgment. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 Mr. Miskiewicz, your response. 25 MR. MISKIEWICZ: Your Honor, I think a motion

for subpoenas, first of all, concedes that Mr. Haley cannot make any of the elements under the Nixon standards.

And, alternatively, he is seeking to apply what's been referred to by other courts as a more liberal or permissive standard articulated by Judge Scheindlin in the Southern District in a couple of cases there, specifically Tucker and Nachamie.

The government's position is that he doesn't even meet those standards, those more permissive standards, because Judge Scheindlin, even if the Court were inclined to adopt that as the basis for issuing Rule 17(c) subpoenas in a criminal case says, among other things, that the defendant has to show that there is an articulable suspicion that the documents may be material to the defense, and that the subpoenas are reasonably construed as material to the defense, and not unduly oppressive for the purpose -- and not unduly oppressive for the producing party to respond to.

There is nothing here but broad categories of documents that are demanded by individuals and/or companies, almost all of which have been assuredly gotten by the defendant Mr. Kenner over the last eight, nine, ten years of the operation of the fraud and various civil litigation that has occurred.

There is absolutely nothing that he articulates

47 1 in his motion that suggests that this is anything but to 2 oppress parties and harass them. 3 Charles Schwab, it's important for the Court to 4 know that in most instances the victims here had accounts 5 at Charles Schwab predating the commencement of the Hawaii 6 property fraud aspect charged in count 1. 7 The evidence will be that the defendant 8 convinced them to move all of their securities, positions, 9 bonds, cash to a different bank, Northern Trust. 10 Accordingly, what possible relevance would 11 Charles Schwab have to any of the counts of the indictment 12 is something that he simply does not explain. 13 THE COURT: Let me ask you to address 14 Mr. Haley's focus, for example, which is any 15 authorizations for the use of funds, to the extent they 16 have not been produced in discovery, why wouldn't it be an 17 important aspect of the case for Mr. Kenner to get 18 whatever authorizations exist in the Northern Trust bank 19 for the use of funds? 20 It seems to me that would be an important aspect 21 of the case, if it's not part of what's been produced 22 already. 23 MR. MISKIEWICZ: First of all, your Honor, I'm 24 not sure I have heard from Mr. Haley that it hasn't been 25 produced.

And, frankly, my review of our Rule 16 production is any authorization by the victims, and there are many letters like this giving power of attorney to the defendant, to the extent the victims signed those, that's been produced.

There are some of those in which victims have looked at both in trial prep here and in civil litigation previously where they have been able to say; that doesn't really look like my signature, and that may be an issue at trial as to whether or not they really signed documents that are proffered, but I'm unaware of any authorization documents that have not been produced in Rule 17 and, as I say, there are quite a few.

With respect to its relevance to any of the counts, there is no question that the defendants obtained letters of credit with the knowledge of the victims for specific purposes regarding development of the Hawaii properties.

And some of them will even say they understood that some of their money would go to a real estate development in Northern California run originally by Mr. Jowdy. That's immaterial.

What none of the victims will say is I authorized Mr. Kenner or Mr. Constantine to take money out of my letter of credit and pay bills, personal bills, or

49 1 buy property that they, as their clients, had no interest 2 in. 3 One of the John Does, Bryan Berard -- I'm sorry, 4 Michael Peca, will testify that he had no idea that his 5 letter of credit money for the Hawaii properties was then 6 sucked out and used to buy property in Sag Harbor, which 7 is the Led Better property fraud alleged in the 8 indictment. 9 So Mr. Haley and the defendant's argument well, 10 we need these authorization letters, again, I think they 11 have them. 12 Secondly, they had them for a long time. 13 Thirdly, the nature of the fraud as it's going 14 to be established at trial, for instance, in Northern 15 Trust bank records, account records, those 13 years of 16 bank account records, they were sent to the defendant 17 Kenner specifically to conceal what was going on with 18 those letters of credit so that the victims could be 19 assured orally and falsely that their money was safe. 20 So I understand the manufactured exculpatory or 21 favorable evidence that Mr. Haley is intending to offer. 22 If we had it, we would give it to them. 23 manufacturing a theory that really isn't favorable or 24 doesn't exculpate any of the basis of the charges here. 25 THE COURT: What about -- is Mr. Berard a victim

50 1 in the case? 2 MR. MISKIEWICZ: Yes. 3 THE COURT: And so one of the things they're 4 requesting is all e-mail, text and supporting 5 documentation between Berard, Kenner and/or John Kaiser 6 relating to meetings and other things related to the 7 Hawaii joint venture with Adam Worth, along with Lehman 8 Brothers and Trimont Real Estate Advisors, Inc. 9 So, again, why wouldn't that -- obviously I have 10 concern with how broad they are, but that doesn't strike 11 me as particularly broad. 12 If he's going to be testifying regarding the 13 Hawaii joint venture, why shouldn't he provide e-mails 14 that relate to that? 15 MR. MISKIEWICZ: Again, because I don't know 16 what the Lehman Brothers loan has anything to do with any 17 of the counts in this indictment. 18 THE COURT: What about the Hawaii joint venture 19 though? 20 MR. MISKIEWICZ: I'm not sure I understand. You 21 mean all of the joint venture agreements? 22 THE COURT: No, e-mails regarding the Hawaii 23 joint venture, e-mails regarding meetings, decisions, 24 potential legal actions regarding the Hawaii joint 25 ventures, is that part of this case?

51 1 MR. MISKIEWICZ: Part of it, yes. 2 THE COURT: If Mr. Berard is going to be 3 testifying about that joint venture, why shouldn't he have 4 to produce e-mails between him and Mr. Kenner and 5 Mr. Kaiser regarding that? That doesn't seem to be 6 particularly onerous or broad. 7 MR. MISKIEWICZ: I really don't have a strong 8 opposition to the production of the e-mails regarding 9 anything that he has to testify about. 10 Frankly, in preparation for trial, we have been 11 trying to see, and we have been periodically supplementing 12 Rule 16 discovery or early 3500 discovery with additional 13 e-mails and such that we have obtained from the various 14 victims. 15 So I guess on that issue, Mr. Berard's e-mail, 16 if they related specifically to the Hawaii venture, I 17 can't say that we have a strong opposition other than I 18 think it's our obligation to turn over affirmatively 19 anything that's favorable, and we take that seriously. 20 THE COURT: You may not have it, right? 21 MR. MISKIEWICZ: Well, we have though, and I 22 take it upon myself as part of my responsibility in 23 preparing witnesses to determine if they have 24 documentation that would constitute 3500 material, and

then within that if there's anything that would be

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52 1 favorable, and that's what we have been doing, and we have 2 been doing that for a number of months. If the Court wanted -- if the Court felt that 3 4 that was sufficiently focused enough, I see the Court's 5 I'm not going to really argue about that. 6 My major concern here was the much broader 7 subpoena for demands both to the banks, again for the 8 reasons I have raised, and also with respect to some of 9 the other material here, it doesn't articulate anything 10 that they could say they have a reasonable grounds to say 11 is favorable to the defense or material to the defense, if 12 that were the standard, and I'm not sure that's the Nixon 13 standard which, again, we still contend is the standard. 14 THE COURT: What about Mr. Kaiser? There's four 15 pages of things with respect to Mr. Kaiser. What's your 16 response? 17 MR. MISKIEWICZ: That much of this material has 18 already been turned over in Rule 16 and/or it begins with 19 documents related to the distribution of funds from the 20 sale of the Sag Harbor property. 21 Again, that material has been disclosed to the 22 defense, to both defendants. 23 Moreover, the nature of the fraud is the fact 24 that he stole money from other people like Mr. Peca and

then stole -- and other victims to buy property and

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asserted himself as the owner of the property.

So the disposition of funds from the seller of that property, Mr. Kaiser and a number of other partners own this property in Sag Harbor. One of the partners wanted to get out of that deal. Mr. Kenner offered to buy the property from Kaiser and his partners.

The nature of the fraud is how did he come up with the money to buy Kaiser out? And what he does was stole the money from other people.

So what Mr. Kaiser then did with the money that he didn't know was stolen by Kenner is, again, I think is just engineered to harass Mr. Kaiser.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me address the computer issue. What's your response on the computer issue?

MR. MISKIEWICZ: With respect to the computer issue, Judge, we cited a number of cases as well as the commentary to the rule governing the downloading and sifting of very voluminous records from computers.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. This is the bottom line question at this juncture and we had some discussion on this months ago, but the privilege review is complete, correct?

MR. MISKIEWICZ: Yes.

THE COURT: I understand the Ganias decision would be assuming that there was no dispute regarding the

54 1 authenticity of the relevant documents that you now pulled 2 from the computer, a mirror image, right? Are they a 3 mirror image? 4 MR. MISKIEWICZ: That's what we're working with. 5 No. We took the actual computer. We have been working 6 with mirror images ever since. 7 THE COURT: Right. 8 Let's assume Mr. Haley and Mr. LaRusso 9 stipulated to the authenticity of the relevant documents 10 that are now classified as the relevant documents at this 11 point in the litigation, why wouldn't the non-pertinent 12 documents, why couldn't the original computer then be 13 returned and the non-pertinent documents eliminated in 14 some way, because there's no reason for the government to 15 hold onto them at this point. 16 I understand if there's no agreement to 17 authenticity you have to hold the computer, pertinent or 18 not pertinent, because there could be an authenticity 19 problem. 20 But assuming that there's not, what would be the 21 reason for retaining the original computer with the 22 non-pertinent documents? 23 This is an independent issue of suppression, but 24 it's an issue of why the government is holding the 25 original computer at that point?

MR. MISKIEWICZ: The short answer is nothing.

However, we've only recently gotten access to the non-privileged documents and for that matter the non-privileged sections of the hard drive in the original computer.

So we're going full blast at this stage commencing really the search of a piece of equipment that was seized 15 months ago or so, and we're not in a position to say what within that we're going to offer and, therefore, we're not even in a position to solicit stipulations from both counsel. If they did it, I would be happy to provide it.

THE COURT: When you say we're searching, I thought the search was done and the documents were reviewed for privilege. I'm confused. I thought the search already happened and that the privilege was reviewing what had been culled from the search. Isn't that what happened?

MR. MISKIEWICZ: My understanding is what happened and, again, because I'm on the opposite side of that wall, I haven't seen what's been produced to Mr. Haley, but my understanding is he's been provided with a list of documents that the taint review team determined then contained attorney/client privileged material and therefore is not going to be provided to us.

Could it be that there are photographs and stuff that's immaterial within a terabyte full of data, we're just not, as I say, we're just beginning that process now.

If there are -- if there is such material, we would be happy to either destroy it, as they did in the Ganias case, or suggested that that would be a way to do it, or simply focus on those things that we think we are going to use in the trial and that were within the search warrant affidavit.

But because of the volume, we were just beginning -- I don't want to say just beginning -- we are at a stage where we're getting a handle on what's there.

There is one other issue with regard to just the return of the machine if you will, and that is the imaged copies are the imaged copies and they can tell us both physically what you see and the metadata behind the documents that survive. There may also be deleted material in that hard drive. Again which, once it's turned back over to the defense, we've lost complete ability to harvest if you will.

THE COURT: I know, but the theory of Ganias is that the government shouldn't be able to -- once they do their thorough search of the computer consistent with the warrant, they shouldn't be able to hold the computer indefinitely and continue to keep going back and

57 1 conducting subsequent searches. That's the theory of 2 Is that the government -- otherwise, it's becomes Ganias. 3 a general warrant at that point. I understand the 4 voluminous nature of the materials. 5 To the extent the government thinks that you can 6 hold the computer indefinitely and keep going back into it 7 to find whether something has been deleted or not deleted, 8 I don't think Ganias would permit the government to do 9 that for a prolong period of time. 10 MR. MISKIEWICZ: And I'm in total agreement with 11 that and I'm not suggesting that we have the right to do 12 that and we would be conducting, as we do in every case, 13 searches based on key words and ranges of documents or 14 date ranges that would hope to find those relevant 15 documents that are covered by the attachments to the 16 search warrant and nothing beyond that. 17 We're not -- in other words, what we are 18 specifically not doing is trolling through the hard drive 19 looking for material and seeing what's there. 20 We are methodically searching what's in the hard 21 drive but because of the volume and the number of 22 individuals, the number of transactions and the date 23 ranges, the search right now continues to go on. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 Mr. Haley, briefly, please.

MR. HALEY: Thank you, Judge. I will endeavor to be brief. I appreciate your Honor's sentiment.

Your Honor, as far as Ganias is concerned, I don't mean to be cute. My argument is that the government can walk and chew gum at the same time.

What do I mean by that, Judge.

To say that the privilege review team has the computer and, accordingly, the prosecution team has to wait until the privilege review team looks at the computer before they can take any action, is drawing a distinction, your Honor, that I think is not in accord with Ganias and what do I mean by that?

When the privilege review team had the computer in its possession, and they turned it on for the first time, they certainly could, in a relatively short period of time, see that there were files on that computer that were personal files, no relevant materiality whatsoever to the investigation, like kids pictures.

Now, I would concede that the government then would have the right to open up that file to see if they're looking at a bunch of children's pictures or family pictures. But once they have done that, they have an obligation under Ganias to purging that information.

To say that the privilege review team somehow gets isolated from the restrictions or the obligations

59 imposed by Ganias, I believe is a suggestion that somehow 1 2 the privilege review team is not part of the United States 3 team, and it is, and really that's my argument, Judge, 4 that there's some law review commentary that is cited in 5 my brief that suggested that Ganias has created a 6 defendant's right to have computer files purged and when 7 the government elects to not purge that information for an 8 extended period of time, and retains that information 9 whether they're looking at it or not, they're not entitled 10 to retain that information. 11 Ganias suggests that the remedy for that is 12 suppression of the documents that are otherwise arguably 13 relevant to the prosecution. 14 Judge, that's my argument. 15 Your Honor, if I may, with reference to the 16 subpoenas, in the superseding indictment the following 17 representation appears. 18 Kenner made a variety of misrepresentations to 19 the investors regarding lines of credit and their use. 20 Our position is he did not make 21 misrepresentations to the investors regarding the line of 22 credit and their use. 23 Our position is the documentary evidence which 24 will consist of documents signed by the Jane Doe or by the 25 John Does on multiple occasions over an extended period of

60 1 time, will reveal that they had full knowledge and 2 understanding of the use of the lines of credit. 3 THE COURT: I know. If you had done a subpoena 4 that said we want any and all communications relating to 5 the lines of credit and their use, that would be one 6 thing. 7 What you've given the Court is four pages of a 8 rider to John Kaiser with no explanation why each and 9 every one of these is relevant to the defense. 10 You asked for 12, 13 years of bank records for 11 Charles Schwab accounts of seven individuals. 12 And you can't give a subpoena that you want the 13 Court to approve for documents in advance of trial that to 14 me is a clearly overbroad fishing expedition, or cite to 15 me one example of something that may be in there that 16 might be relevant to the case. 17 If you want to put in a narrower request for 18 certain things, that's one thing. To think that I'm going 19 to sign a subpoena that requests 12 years of bank records 20 for these individuals is not going to happen. 21 It doesn't meet the standard as the government 22 points to of Nixon. It doesn't even meet the lower 23 standard of Judge Scheindlin. It meets no standard. 24 If you want documents in advance of trial, they

have to be requests that are specifically targeted for

25

relevant evidence in the case and you have to make that showing and the showing that you need it in advance of trial.

I'm prepared, because I don't want the trial to be delayed, to give you categories of documents of some of the ones that you indicated today for the reasons I said to the government; yes, even though they're endeavoring to do it, I have no problem so that you and your client can be comfortable that you're getting everything that's out there, issuing a subpoena to a victim that they provide all communications related to a particular transaction or line of credit, but these are not narrow requests and that's the problem.

If you don't make narrow requests, I'm going to deny your application and we will wait until they have testified. You can ask, did you produce all documents you had for a line of credit and they'll answer under oath whatever they produced or not, and that's the way we will deal with it.

This only deals with whether he gets them in advance of trial, and this is not a sufficient showing for him to get these broad categories of documents for individuals in advance of trial. That's the issue.

Mary Ann Steiger, CSR Official Court Reporter

MR. HALEY: May I respond?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HALEY: Your Honor, we went to great pains to actually isolate specific documents so we're not going through an alleged fishing expedition. These 23 documents that are listed are designed to make sure that the request stays focused in terms of documents that were signed with respect to the lines of credit. That's why we did it.

If I asked for a subpoena that said give us any and all banking records regarding lines of credit maintained by the respective John Does during this period of time, I suspect that would be overbroad and I respectfully understand your Honor's hesitancy to issue such a subpoena. That would be broadly-based.

The time period we're asking for, it may be when that subpoena comes in, it may be, depending upon the particular investor, the particular John Doe, that we may only get let's say one year that contains all those 23 documents.

THE COURT: Why should you get the Charles
Schwab account of these -- the entire Charles Schwab
account of these individuals for 13 years, for 13 years,
because based on what Mr. Miskiewicz told me, in response
to communications with your client, they transferred money
from Charles Schwab to Northern Trust, and that's not even
a dispute in this case. Nobody is disputing that they
transferred the money. Why should you get 12 years of

their bank records?

MR. HALEY: If I may, Judge, my theory is this, that the transfers from the Charles Schwab account to the line of credit indicate early on that there were discussions between my client and respective investors as relates to taking funds out of the Charles Schwab account and going into the Northern Trust account.

When their signatures appears on those documents, they could be requested to describe the circumstances under which you came to transfer your Charles Schwab funds to the line of credit, is that your signature? Yes. And what, if any, discussions did you have with Phil Kenner regarding that? We're talking about how these monies would be transferred from Charles Schwab.

THE COURT: Does your Charles Schwab subpoena limit it to transfers? Does it limit it in any way to transfers to the Northern Trust bank? Does it?

MR. HALEY: Your Honor, if I may, to answer your question, the answer is no. The answer is I will concede that we do not need the Charles Schwab records, because I will concede that the more critical point as relates to the allegations as set forth in the indictment are the records that come out of Northern Trust.

I will, for purposes of answering your Honor's question, concede that issue, Judge. We were looking to

64 1 obtain records that we believe are relevant and material 2 to the defense. Your Honor takes a different view of the 3 Charles Schwab. I'm not going to press the issue. I will 4 concede that. 5 Your Honor, if I may, when Mr. Miskiewicz argues 6 to the Court that we haven't met the Nixon standard, I 7 believe we have. 8 Our position is, Judge, I need not set the bar higher than it need be for purposes of my understanding of 9 10 the law. 11 My understanding of the law is that United 12 States v. Nixon does not apply. I argued that in my 13 brief. 14 I believe, if your Honor finds Nixon does apply, 15 we met that standard. I do endeavor to be brief. 16 I spent a great deal of time in this case 17 getting an understanding, at least from my perspective, of 18 the myriad financial transactions that went on. 19 When you speak in terms of the Kaiser 20 indictment, because I know your Honor mentioned that and 21 it's four pages, but what your Honor must understand is 22 this. 23 The Northport property was owned by John Kaiser 24 and three other individuals. One of them was a Chris 25 Manfredi. Mr. Kaiser wanted Manfredi out of the LLC.

Mr. Kaiser approached Phil Kenner --

THE COURT: Mr. Haley, I don't mean to interrupt you. We're not going to go into the whole history with the relationship with Mr. Kaiser. It's 4:00. It's not going to cure, in my view, what is clearly an overbroad request for a subpoena.

I'm going to place my ruling on the record with respect to that without prejudice to you submitting additional information to the Court. We're not going to do that orally here. I'm not going to sit here and have you go through and explain why four pages of requests to John Kaiser are relevant to your case. You can do that in writing. We're not going to sit here as you do that.

The Court's ruling is as under the Nixon standard, United States vs. Nixon, which, in my view, is what applies here, 18 U.S. 683, the standard for Rule 17 subpoena in advance of trial has not been met.

I have a broad category of requests from individuals and from banks and Mr. Kenner has one or two paragraphs in his affidavit, Mr. Haley mirrors those words in his memorandum of law, and it is woefully insufficient to support the Court, under the Nixon standard, requiring all these categories of documents which in terms of how broad they are with respect to the bank records to be produced in advance of trial.

There is an insufficient showing that all these categories of documents are evidentiary and relevant.

There's been no showing that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by the exercise of due diligence.

There's no showing that they can't properly prepare for trial without the production and inspection in advance of trial, and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend to unreasonably delay the trial.

And I certainly conclude that the way they are now, it is a fishing expedition even under Judge Sheindlin's standard in the Tucker case. And, as I said before, it doesn't meet even that standard. The Tucker case was 2008 Westlaw 361127, Southern District of New York, 2008.

Under her standard there has to be a showing that the defendant has articulable suspicion the documents may be material to his defense, and that it's not unduly oppressive for the producing party to respond.

And, again, the categories of documents are way too broad and no explanation has been provided as to why they may be material to the defense, and I'm not going to require them to be produced in advance of trial given the way they have been presented to this Court.

I'm sensitive to the fact that Mr. Kenner wants

all of the documents that he needs to question the various witnesses, and it's possible that some of these categories of documents, that in order to not delay the trial, would

be helpful for him to have in advance of the trial to the

5 extent that they haven't already been produced and to the

6 extent that the government is not also seeking them from

the same individuals in the context of presenting the

8 evidence.

However, if, in fact, it's going to be done under this rule, there would have to be a more narrow request with an explanation for why those particular documents are relevant to the defense and why they need to be produced in advance of trial.

I'm willing to look at it again, but I'm not going to blindly sign subpoenas for 12 years of bank records for nine individuals who I have no information why 12 years of 13 years of bank records would be necessary.

I'm using that as an example. John Kaiser is four pages of requests. I have no idea what each and every one of those requests would relate to.

I understand the properties based on Mr. Haley's explanation, I understand that, but that has to be explained in more detail for me to sign off on those subpoenas. That's my ruling with regard to that.

On the computer issue I agree with the

government. I'm denying the motion to suppress. I agree with the government's interpretation of Ganias in terms of a suppression issue, whether the Court should suppress the evidence from the laptop and the iPhone because the Government has not neither purged nor returned not pertinent e-mails.

The Ganias situation is entirely different.

It's where they held it for 13 months and then went to get a second warrant, and at that stage the Court suppressed and said it's been converted to a general warrant.

Here, I think it's obvious from the record and numerous conferences we had regarding this that there's a voluminous amount of records that exist with respect to that computer. It's further complicated by the privilege review that has to be done. There are over 300,000 pages of documents that are in issue here.

So my conclusion is that there's been no demonstration that the Government's efforts to review the materials, pertinent and not pertinent, privilege and not privilege, has been a bad faith effort by them to retain Mr. Kenner's not pertinent e-mails for future use to try to go back in and use them at some later time, or for any bad faith purpose other than the fact that these records are voluminous and there's got to be interaction between the taint review team and Mr. Haley regarding the

privilege documents that's preventing the trial team from getting access to the computer.

As I said before, I'm willing to fully ensure that once if there's any authenticity issues that are -- if all authenticity issues are resolved, that the original computer be returned or that once all these issues have been resolved that it be purged, the non-pertinent portions be purged, if there's not a stipulation regarding authenticity of the relevant documents.

But we're not at that stage yet and the trial is two months away. This is one of these cases where the review is continuing right up to the trial date. I'm not sure exactly how this Ganias issue would be playing out in this case. We're so close to the trial.

But there certainly is no basis to suppress the evidence because the government to this point has not purged not pertinent e-mail or returned the computer in light of the clearly ongoing review of both the pertinent materials and the privileged materials as relates to the computer, so the motion is denied.

Mr. Haley, on the subpoenas, I'm here every day. If you and your client want to revise them, narrow them and provide a short explanation for why each is relevant to the case and do it ex parte, the government doesn't have to see that, I'm here to look at it. They have to be

1	narrowed.	70
2	Is there anything else?	
3	MR. MISKIEWICZ: Nothing from the government.	
4	THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. LaRusso?	
5	MR. LARUSSO: No. Thank you, your Honor.	
6	THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Haley?	
7	MR. HALEY: No, sir.	
8	THE COURT: Thank you.	
9	MR. MISKIEWICZ: Thank you, your Honor.	
10	(Proceedings in this matter are concluded.)	
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